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H ISTORIANS have  been  unable  to  agree  who  first  discovered  Antarctica, or even who first navigated antarctic waters. It was common for early 
ships  in  the  southern  Atlantic  and  southern Pacific  to come near  to  icebergs 
drifting northward, and doubtlessly some large ones were mistaken for 
islands.  What is certain is that, long  before  anyone  was  there,  the  existence 
of a  vast  austral  continent,  covered  with ice and  snow,  was taken for granted. 
There is even  suspicion  among  cartographers  that  Columbus  took  with 
him on his  first  voyage  to the  New World  a map of the  antarctic  coastline, 
later stolen by the Turkish geographer Piri Reis, who made use of it in 
drawing  his  map of the world. An  existing  fragment of the  early  map, now 
in  the  Library of Congress, is believed by cartographer A. H. Mallery to 
represent  the  ice-free  antarctic  continent of some 5000 years ago2. 
The  National  Library of Madrid  contains  a  map  made  by  Christuenum 
Sgrothenum  in 1588 showing  the  line of demarcation  based on the  Treaty 
of Tordesillas.  The  line  on  the  original  map  extended  to  the  South  Pole,  and 
the  vague  outlines of the  antarctic  continent  are  seen  surrounding  the  polar 
area.  This  map is reproduced  in  Pinochet  de  la  Barra’s  book  “La  AntQrtica 
Chilena”3. 
The  earliest  recorded  discovery of land  south of the  antarctic  conver- 
gence  was  that of the  English  merchant  Antonio  de  la Roche,  who  sighted  a 
snow-covered island, now believed to have been South Georgia, in 1675. 
Captain  James Cook circumnavigated  the  whole  continent  in 1772-5 without 
ever  sighting  land. In 1819-20, within  a  few  months of one another,  an  Amer- 
ican,  an  Englishman,  and  a  Russian,  came  very close to  the  mainland,  but 
whether  they  actually  sighted  the  continent or offshore  islands has  not  been 
established with certainty4. 
The  British  believe  that  the  continent  was  sighted  by  the  British  captain 
Edward  Bransfield  aboard  the  brig Williams on January 20, 18205. American 
investigators  generally  contend  that  Bransfield  sighted  only an island,  and 
that  the first  to  see the  mainland  was  Nathaniel B. Palmer,  captain of the 
sealing vessel Hero, on November 17, 18206. Soviet spokesman attribute 
the  discovery  to  an  admiral  in  the  Imperial  Russian  Navy,  Fabian  Gottlieb 
von  Bellingshausen,  a  native of the  Baltic  island of Oesel,  who,  together with 
his  companion Lt.  Mikhail  Petrovitch  Lazarev, commanded the  naval vessels 
Vostok and Mirny in  a  circumnavigation of Antarctica  in 1819-20‘. 
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Bellingshausen’s  expedition  was  an official undertaking of the  Imperial 
Navy. Although his records contain no reference to the sighting of land 
identified  as  a  part of the  continent,  the All-Soviet  Geographical  Congress 
concluded in 1949 that  he was the  discoverer of Antarctica.  At  the  Antarctic 
Conference of 1959 the Soviet delegate Mr. V. Kuznetsov stated: “as is 
known, [Russian] navigators and scientists, Bellingshausen and Lazarev, 
were  the f i s t  to  discover  the  sixth  continent at the  beginning of the  nine- 
teenth  century”.  Such  a claim is also set  forth  in Russkie  Otkryli  Antarktiku 
(Russians  discovered  the  Antarctic), 19508. 
The official US. Government  publication  “Introduction  to  Antarctica”, 
1961, has  this to  say  about  the  Bellingshausen  expedition:  “their  commander 
was a fine Baltic sailor named Bellingshausen, who was an officer in the 
Russian Navy. Bellingshausen was a cautious man. At times during 1820, 
he  saw  what  might  have  been  land,  but  it also  might  have  been  giant  icebergs 
stuck  fast  in  the  pack. Unless he was sure,  he would  not  say so. Finally, on 
January 28, 1821, he saw a rugged, mountainous coast which he named 
Alexander I Land  after  the  Emperor of Russia.  Later  explorers  have shown 
that  Alexander I Land is really an island  separated  from  the  continent by 
a narrow, ice-filled  trait"^. 
The “Encyclopedia Brittanica” says: “he almost certainly sighted, but 
did not recognize as land, two coastal areas between longitudes 5”W. and 
20”E. The  first  was on January 28,1820, two  days  before  Edward  Bransfield’s 
discovery of the Palmer Peninsula, which, if Bellingshausen is left out of 
account,  is  the  first-known  sighting of the  antarctic continent”lO. 
A  popular  definition of the  Antarctic is all land  and  water  south of the 
60th  parallel  south,  but  a  broader  concept,  much  used  among  geographers, 
is  that  it  includes  everything  south of the  antarctic  convergence, defined in 
“Geographic Names of Antarctica” as “a line encircling Antarctica where 
the cold, northward-flowing antarctic waters sink beneath the relatively 
warmer  waters of the  sub-Antarctic”.  This  belt  extends  across  the  Atlantic, 
Pacific and Indian oceans between the 48th and 61st parallels and moves 
slightly  north  and  south  with  changing  weather conditions. The  South  Shet- 
land, South Orkney, South Sandwich, and South Georgia islands all lie 
south of the  convergence,  whereas  the  Falkland  Islands  and  Cape  Horn lie 
north of the convergencell. 
The Antarctic is usually considered to consist of four quadrants as 
follows:  American (OO-SO’W.), Pacific (9O0-18O”W.), African  (0”-90”E.), 
and  Australian (90”-180”E.). Of the  American  quadrant  the  sector  from 0” 
to 20”W. is  claimed by Norway. It is  in  the  remainder of the  quadrant  that 
the claims of Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom overlap. This 
quadrant includes the Great Antarctic Peninsula, known to Americans as 
the  Palmer  Peninsula,  to  Britons as Graham  Land,  to  Argentines  as  Tierra 
San Martin, and to Chileans as Tierra O’Higgins. This peninsula actually 
extends slightly beyond the Antarctic Circle at 66”30’S., and, being the 
northernmost  part of the  continent, is the  warmest,  the most nearly  habitable, 
and the most accessible. A geological extension of the South American 
continent,  although some 700 miles  away, it is the  area most readily  reached 
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from  the  outside  world,  particularly  from  Argentina  and Chile. I t  is, without 
doubt,  the most  coveted part of Antarctica,  and it  is  not  surprising  that  here 
three conflicting territorial claims  overlap. 
Although an American was one of the first to see Antarctica, and 
although  American  explorers  and  scientists  have  engaged  in  extensive  activ- 
ities there,  the  United  States  has  never  seen fit to  make  a  territorial  claim. 
Secretary of State  Charles  Evans  Hughes  expressed  in 1924 the opinion that 
“discovery of lands unknown to civilization, even when coupled with the 
formal taking of possession, does not support  a  valid claim to sovereignty 
unless  the  discovery is  followed by actual  settlement of the  discovered  ter- 
ritory”12.  From  time to  time  the  question  has  been  reviewed  by  the  United 
States  Government,  but  the policy  remained  virtually  the  same.  The  United 
States  makes no claim,  recognizes  none, but  reserves all its  rights. 
Of the other powers with a history of discovery or activity in the 
Antarctic,  only  Russia  has followed substantially  the  same  line  as  the  United 
States. Norway, Australia, New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom, 
Argentina,  and  Chile  have  all  carved  out  for  themselves slic of the  antarctic 
pie, and the claims of Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom largely 
overlap  one  another.  Although  the  three  rivals are  grateful  that  the  United 
States  has  not  added  its claim  to the  others  in  the  disputed  area, ll  claimant 
powers  have  made no secret of their wish that  the  United  States would step 
in  and  assert  a claim  to the one  remaining  unclaimed  part,  the  sector  between 
90” and 150”W., most of which is an inaccessible  plateau  known as  Marie 
Byrd  Land.  That  the  United  States  has  not  done so is  consistent  with  the 
Hughes  policy,  which  Washington  has never changed.  Indeed, if the  United 
States  were to become a  claimant, it would be  more  likely  to  include  in  its 
claim the  more accessible and  valuable  territory  in  other  parts of the con- 
tinent  where  American  explorers  have  been,  but  such  action would  precipi- 
tate a disagreement with several friendly countries. To lay claim to the 
unclaimed  sector  alone  would  appear  to  have  the  effect of acitly  renouncing 
American  rights  elsewhere. 
The antarctic claimant powers follow the “sector” theory. This is the 
system  adopted  early  in the 20th century  in  support of claims in  the  Arctic; 
It was  advanced by the  Canadian  Senator  Pascal  Poirier  and  means,  simply, 
that if a  country  has  territory  extending  poleward  that  country  has  a  right 
to  all  land  up  to  the pole. As  applied  to  the  Antarctic it  has  been coupled 
with  the  principle of contiguity,  and  in some cases  held  to  mean that all  land 
straight  south of the  metropolitan  territory  can  be claimed13. 
The  Treaty of Tordesillas  has  also  been  invoked,  primarily  by  Chile,  to 
defend  the  principle of a  sector  extending  along  a  meridian  to  the  pole,  as 
well  as the  assertion  that  the  treaty  made  Spanish (or Portuguese)  all  un- 
discovered  land  south to the 
Chile  bases her claim  on the  inheritance of Spain’s  rights  transferred  to 
her  at  the  time of her  independence  in 1810. In 1539 Charles V of Spain is 
said  to  have  granted  Pedro SBnchez de Hoz all territory  from  the  Strait of 
Magellan  to the  South  Pole  west of 40”W. At  that  time  the  land  south of the 
Strait, Tierra del Fuego, was believed to extend indefinitely to the south. 
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This  grant devolved on Pedro  de  Valdivia  and  ultimately came under  the 
Captaincy  General of Chile.  After  independence,  in 1831, Bernard0 O’Hig- 
gins, who was  Chile’s  first  president,  wrote a  letter  stating  that  the  South 
Shetland  Islands,  which  had  recently  been  visited  by  British,  American,  and 
Russian  navigators,  were  Chilean  territory.  “Chile”,  he  wrote,  “holds  the  key 
to  the  Atlantic  from 30”s.  to  the  South  Pole  and  to all the  Great Pacific”15. 
Chile  consolidated her position  in the  Straits of Magellan  and Tierra  del 
Fuego  and  established  the  town of Punta  Arenas  in 1843. Later  in  the 19th 
century  a  dispute  between  Chile  and  Argentina  over  territory  in  Patagonia, 
the Straits of Magellan, and certain offshore islands, was settled by the 
Treaty of 1881. Tierra del Fuego was divided between the two countries 
along the meridian 68’24’W. down to the Beagle Channel. The islands on 
the Atlantic side were assigned to Argentina, and those on the Pacific 
side to Chile. The protocol of 1893 amplifying this treaty provided that 
“sovereignty of each state over the respective littoral is absolute so that 
Chile cannot claim any point toward the Atlantic and Argentina cannot 
claim  any  point  toward the Pacific”16. 
Chile’s  leading antarctic  authority,  Oscar  Pinochet  de  la  Barra, concedes 
that  Chile  had only an “imperfect”  (i.e.,  not  perfected)  title  to  a  part of the 
Antarctic  until 1906. In  that  year  the  government  granted  a fishing conces- 
sion  to  two  Chilean  citizens,  Fabry  and  Toro  Herrera,  under  the  terms of 
which  the concessionaires were  authorized  not  only  to  exploit  but  to  “assure 
Chilean dominion over” the Diego Ramirez, South Shetland, and South 
Georgia  islands,  and  Graham  Land. In  the  same  year  the  Sociedad  Ballenera 
de Magallanes  was  authorized  by official decree  to  operate  in  the  antarctic 
seas.  The  company  established  a  base of operations on Deception  Island  in 
the South Shetland Islands. This station was used until 1911 and then 
abandoned.  Furthermore,  an official expedition  to  the  South  Shetland  Islands 
had  been  planned  in 1906, but  was  cancelled  because of the  earthquake of 
August 16. However,  in  the official note  to the Chilean  Navy  Department 
about  the proposed  expedition  Foreign  Minister  Antonio  Hunneus  stated  that 
one of the  purposes  was  to  “make effective  by all  means  at  the government’s 
disposal the  sovereignty  vested  in  it  over  the  Shetland  Islands  and  over the 
southern  continent,  which,  until  today,  seem  to  have  remained  abandoned, 
and  establishing  firmly by means of occupation  its  title  to  the dominion of 
the  antarctic  region,  preventing  other  foreign flags from  ruling  regions  that 
are connected with or adjoining to the continent”. These three events of 
1906, Pinochet  de  la  Barra  asserts,  had  the effect of “perfecting”  Chile’s  title 
to  the  antarctic  territory  that  was  to  be officially proclaimed in 194017. 
In 1907 Chile  proposed  to  Argentina that  the two  countries  should  reach 
an  agreement  as  to  the  division of the  land  within  the  spirit of the  Treaty 
of 1881, but  received  a  rebuke  from  Argentina to the effect that  it  was  well 
known  that  the  land was  claimed  by Britainls. 
Britain  really  started  “political  history” of the  Antarctic  when  she  pub- 
lished  her  letters  patent of July 21,1908, asserting  sovereignty  over  a  number 
of islands  as  well  as  Graham  Land,  and placing it all under  the  administra- 
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tion of the  Falkland  Islands,  henceforth  to  be  known  as  the  Falkland  Islands 
Dependencies.  From  the  outset  it was made clear that title to these terri- 
tories  was  not  the  same  as  to  the  Falkland  Islands  themselves,  but  that  this 
was only  a matter of administrative  convenience. It was  likewise  stated  that 
this  merely  established  definite  limits  over  territory  that  had  been  under  the 
effective  control  and  sovereignty of Britain for many  years. 
The British claim, as announced in 1908, was to the “South Orkney, 
South Georgia and South Shetland islands, and Graham Land situated in 
the  South  Atlantic Ocean  to the  south of the 50th parallel of south  latitude 
and  lying  between  the  20th  and  80th  degrees of west  longitude”.  Clarifying 
letters  patent  were  issued on March 28, 1917, defining the claim  more  pre- 
cisely to exclude anything north of the 58th parallel and west of 5OoW., 
since it had  been  observed  that  a  literal  interpretation of the  original claim 
would  have taken  in  a  part of the  South  American  mainland  and  Tierra  del 
Fuego.  Britain’s  claim  was  based on alleged  discoveries  and  acts of annexa- 
tion  by  British  nationals  in  the  period 1675-1843 and  the  display  and  exercise 
of sovereignty  between 1843 and 19081e. 
At  this  point  it  is  desirable  to look back  to 1903 when  a  Scottish  expedi- 
tion  headed  by Dr. W. S. Bruce  established  a meteorological station on Laurie 
Island  in  the  South  Orkney  group (60’44’5”s.  40’42’5”W.) inside the 
accepted limits of the  Antarctic.  The  Bruce  party  remained  from  April 1, 
1903 until  February 22,1904, at which  time  the  station  was  transferred  to  the 
Argentine  Government  Meteorological Office. In  the  ceremony of transfer, 
the flag of Scotland  (sic)  was  taken  down  and  replaced  by  that of Argentina. 
The  Scottish  scientists  were  evacuated  by  an  Argentine  vessel  and  the  Laurie 
Island  observatory  has  been  maintained  and  manned  by  the  Argentine Gov- 
ernment  ever since. It is the place in  the  Antarctic  that  has  been  continuously 
inhabited for by far  the  longest  period - the  strongest peg on which  Argen- 
tina  subsequently  came  to  hang  her  extensive  antarctic  claims. 
A  member of the  Bruce  party,  R. N. Rudmose  Brown,  wrote  in 1906 in 
his book “The voyage of the  Scotia”: 
“Often,  among the  varied  topics  brought  forward  in  the  cabin  in  the  long  winter 
evenings,  arose the question of the ownership of the  South Orkneys.  And after  many 
long  discussions  we  arrived at  the pleasing  conclusion that  even  in  this age of impe- 
rialism the  South  Orkneys  had escaped the  grasp of any  country,  and  that  we  enjoyed 
the privilege of living in No-man’s Land. But I fear it is no longer so. Not that  we 
claimed  them for  Britain,  -for  even if we  had  been  seized  with  a  desire  to  widen  the 
confines of our empire,  we  could  not lay claim to new territory  in  our country’s name 
without  having  a  Government  mandate, - and  as  for claiming  them  for  Scotland, I 
fear  that  still less would have  been  recognized,  though in Mossman they  certainly  had 
a Scotsman  for their first governor.  However,  when the Scotia returned  to  the island 
in  February 1904, with an Argentine staff to  take over the meteorological  observatory 
at  Osmond House under the auspices of the Argentine Government, the Argentine 
naval flag was hoisted on the cairn where formerly the Scottish Lion flew; and I 
presume the South Orkneys are looked upon as a possession of that power,-the 
nucleus of an empire, perhaps, they may even seem to ambitious Argentine expan- 
sionisk”20 
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Brown  remained  in  opposition  to  the  principle of territorial claim in  the 
Antarctic. In 1947 he wrote: 
“Continuous occupation over any length of time in the Antarctic regions could 
be  claimed  only  by  Argentina  who  since 1904 has  maintained  a  meteorological  observ- 
atory  at  the  South  Orkney Islands and  has  recently  founded  another  on  the  west  side 
of Graham  Land. . . . No state  has  the  right to claim  sovereignty  over  land  which it 
cannot administer and that argument can be used against all sovereign claims in 
Antarctica.”ZI 
Despite  the  establishment of the meteorological station  in 1904, neither 
Argentina  nor  Chile  objected  to  the  promulgation of the  British claims in 
1908. The  Argentine  Foreign Office addressed  a  note  to  the  British  Minister 
in Buenos Aires, asking for information about the matter. The Minister 
forwarded  him  a copy of the Falkland  Islands Gazette carrying  the  letters 
patent,  and  received  a brief  and routine  note of acknowledgement,  without 
further  comment,  which  prompted  him  to  report  to London that  Argentina 
presumably recognized the British claimz2. 
This interpretation was strengthened by the fact that an Argentine 
company, the Compafiiia Argentina de Pesca, applied for and obtained a 
British  lease  to  land on South  Georgia  Island.  A  similar  request  was  received 
from a Chilean company, the South Georgia Exploration Company, and 
another  Chilean  company,  the  Sociedad  Ballenera  de  Magallanes,  took  out 
a  British  whaling license.  (The  Chilean  Government  cites the  operation of 
this company in the South Shetland Islands in support of its claim.)23 
Argentina’s  apparent  acquiescence  did  not  mean  that  she  was  not  inter- 
ested  in  advancing  her  interests  in  the  area. In 1914 Argentina  negotiated 
with  Britain  for  the  transfer of the  South  Orkney  Islands  to  Argentina  in 
exchange  for  some  urban  real  estate  in  Buenos  Aires  that  was  to  be  the  site 
of the  British Embassy.  Arrangements  were  well  advanced  when  a  change 
of government in Buenos Aires prevented the deal”. 
The first overt assertion of an Argentine counterclaim was in 1925. 
Argentina had erected a wireless station at the Laurie Island weather 
observatory  without  asking  the  British  for  a  license  in  accordance  with  the 
regulations of the  International  Telegraph  convention.  When  Britain called 
this to  Argentina’s  attention,  the  reply  was  that  the  station  was on Argentine 
territoryz5. 
The 1920’s and 1930’s were  a  period of intense  United  States  exploration 
in  Antarctica.  Commander  Richard E. Byrd  made  his  spectacular flight over 
the  South  Pole on November 29,  1929 from  his  base  at  Little  America  (New 
Zealand sector).  Byrd’s second  expedition  (1933-5),  privately  financed  like 
the first,  laid the  foundation  for  what is  recognized  to be  the  United  States’ 
greatest contribution to antarctic technology - the adaptation of modern 
techniques  and  equipment.  Another  American  explorer  active  in  Antarctica 
in  the 1930’s was  Lincoln  Ellsworth, who made  the first  trans-antarctic flight 
and later surveyed from the air the section now known as the American 
HighlandzB. 
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Byrd’s third  antarctic  expedition (1939-41) was  made  under  government 
sponsorship. Two bases  were  established,  one  at  the old Little  America  site 
and  one on Marguerite  Bay  on  the  Palmer  Peninsula. It was  intended  that 
these should be permanent stations, which might have given the United 
States  the  right  to  make  territorial claims  within the  spirit of the  Hughes 
declaration, but the deterioration of the international situation and the 
outbreak of World War I1 led  to  the  premature  termination of the  expedition 
and  the closing of the  settlements. 
However,  Byrd’s  expedition  did  advance  American  rights  in  two  ways. 
The  primary  objective  was to explore the region between 78” and 148”W. 
(Marie Byrd Land and Ellsworth Highland) where a potential American 
claim was strongest. President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent Amiral Byrd a 
letter of instruction  dated November 25, 1939 - not  made  public  until  many 
years  later - authorizing  members of the  Service  to  “take  appropriate  steps 
such as the dropping of written claims from airplanes, depositing such 
writing  in  cairns,  etc.,  which  might  assist  in  supporting  a  sovereignty  claim 
by the United States Government”27. 
The  outbreak of World War I1 also  had other  repercussions  in  the  south- 
ern continent.  The  Third  Reich  under Adolf Hitler  had become  increasingly 
interested  in  whaling  and wished  to secure  a foothold in  Antarctica  as  a  base 
for  operations.  Apparently  desirous of avoiding an  unnecessary conflict with 
the British or antagonizing the Americans, North or South, the Germans 
concentrated their activities on the then unclaimed sector between 20”W. 
and 45”E. Norwegian whalers and explorers  had  a  record of long activity 
in  that  area,  but  Norway  had  never  laid claim to it. The season of 1938-9 
was to be devoted to aerial reconnaissance and mapping, to be followed 
the  next  year  by  a  more  substantial  expedition.  The  exploration was  carried 
out by an 8,000-ton catapult ship, the Schwabenland, equipped with two 
10-ton  Dornier-Wal  seaplanes  that  could fly inland  from  the  ship  lying off 
the coast.  This  operation  was carried  out for 10 days  in  January  and  Feb- 
ruary 1939, with  thrusts  extending  up to 300 miles  inland,  and  resulted  in 
the  discovery of mountains  over 13,000 feet high. The  Germans  named  this 
area Neu Schwabenland‘*. 
However, on January  14,1939,  5  days  before  the first  flight, the  govern- 
ment of Norway, apparently alarmed at the prospect of losing out to the 
Germans  in  the  area  explored  by  Amundsen  in 1911 and  named  Queen  Maud 
Land,  announced  Norway’s  claim  to  the  entire  coastal  area  from  20”W.  to 
45°E.29. 
Nevertheless, the German party dropped markers claiming the land 
for the  Reich.  Ernst  Hermann,  the  geographer,  later  reported  that  the  party 
landed on the ice shelf and  raised  the  swastika  a  few  hundred  metres  from 
the edge. “This  is  the  outward  sign  that we Germans  have  trod  this 
no-man’s land  and claimed it  for  Greater  Germany”,  wrote  Hermann.  “The 
first German colony!”, he added. A “native” waddled forward to meet 
them  and  they  greeted  him  with  a  “Heil  Hitler!”  “The  penguin”,  Hermann 
reported, “was not impre~sed”~~ .  
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After  the  outbreak of the  war  German  raider-commandos  operating  in 
antarctic  waters seized a  number of Norwegian whalers  and  factory  ships 
and  operated  them  for  Germany.  In  the  waters  near  the  subarctic  islands 
along  the  arm of the  Palmer  Peninsula  German  raiders could take  refuge, 
rendezvous with their supply ships and land their crews for recreation. 
Operating  from  such  refuges,  they  sank or captured  several  hundred  thou- 
sand tons of allied shipping. 
Even  before,  fears  were  felt  in  Washington  lest  German  activities  based 
in  the  Antarctic  might  endanger  American  and allied shipping. It was also 
feared  that  as  an  incident  in  its  war  with  Britain,  Germany might seize the 
British-claimed Palmer Peninsula and thus gain a foothold close to the 
South American continent. When the 21 American republics issued the 
Declaration of Panama in September 1939, they established a neutrality 
zone surrounding  the  North  and  South  American  continents.  This  included 
some islands and waters of the Antarctic. On May 24, 1940 Secretary of 
State  Cordell  Hull  said  “Considerations f continental  defense  make it vitally 
important to keep for the 21 American republics a clearer title to  the 
Antarctic  continent  south of America  than is  claimed by  any  non-American 
~ o u n t r y ” ~ ~ .  
It seems  likely  that Hull’s pronouncement  encouraged  both  Chile  and 
Argentina  to  press  their  territorial claims. On November 6, 1940 President 
Pedro  Aguirre  Cerda  issued  an  executive  decree defining Chile’s antarctic 
territory as “all the lands, islands, islets, reefs, glaciers (ice pack) already 
known or to be discovered and their respective territorial waters in the 
sector  constituted  by  the  meridians 53” and 90” west of Greenwich”32. 
The  United  States  probably  had  not  intended Hull’s statement  to  result 
in such  a  sweeping  claim  on the  part of one  American  republic,  but  from 
the  Chilean point of view it was  step  in  the  direction of “keeping  for  the 
21 American  republics  a  clearer title to  that  part of the  Antarctic  continent 
south of America  than is claimed by  any non-American country”.  The  United 
States voiced no complaint when  Chile  announced  her claim, but  restated 
the  Hughes policy and  the  American policy of making  and recognizing no 
claims. Britain objected and  reminded  Chile  that  most of the  territory  she 
was claiming had  been  British  for  many  years.  Argentina  reminded  Chile 
of her own rights  in  the  area  and proposed  a  meeting to  talk  it  over.  Julio 
Escuedero  Guzm6n of Chile  and  Isidoro Ruiz  Moreno of Argentina  met  in 
March 1941 and  agreed  on  two  things: (1) that  a South American  Antarctic 
exists and (2) that  the  only  countries  with  exclusive  rights of sovereignty 
over  it  are  Argentina  and Chile. 
Several subsequent meetings have been held between Argentine and 
Chilean  representatives  in  an effort to reconcile their differences. The 
Foreign Ministers of the two countries met in Buenos Aires in July 1947 
and  issued  a joint statement  expressing  the  hope  that  there  would soon be 
reached an Argentine-Chilean  agreement on demarcation of boundaries.  On 
March 4,1948 the  La Rosa-Vergara Donoso declaration  was  issued,  whereby 
the  two  countries  agreed  to co-operate in  the zone of their combined, but 
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not common, sovereignty - 25" to 9O"W. This  declaration  is  often  referred 
to as the Argentine-Chilean Declaration of Mutual Rights33. 
In addition  to  pressing  her  historical  claims  Chile  asserts  that  geograph- 
ical factors favour her rights. She asserts that the Antarctic Peninsula is 
a  continuation of the  Andean  Cordillera  as  indicated  by  a  submarine  ridge 
that  connects  in  a wide curve  to  the  east  the  tip of Tierra  del  Fuego  and 
the Antarctic Peninsula. If the crest of the Andes is recognized as the 
boundary between Argentina and Chile on the mainland, Chile contends, 
then  the  submerged  range  is  the true dividing  line  between  the  waters of 
the  Atlantic  and  the Pacific  oceans. Under  the  treaty of 1881 islands  in  the 
Atlantic  Ocean  belong  to  Argentina  and  those  in  the  Pacific  Ocean  to  Chile. 
Chile  would  stand  to  lose if the  meridian 68"34'W., dividing  Tierra  del  Fuego, 
were  accepted  as  the  line of demarcation  in  the  sea  and  in  Antarctica.  A New
Zealand  scientist,  Rhodes W. Fairbridge,  author of "The Geology of the  Ant- 
arctic" (1952), supports the submarine ridge thesis advanced by Chile34. 
Chile's  proclamation,  Hull's  declaration,  and  British  involvement  in  the 
war  were  probably  factors  that  induced  Argentina to  send  the  Primero  de 
Mayo, a  naval  vessel,  to  the  Antarctic  in 1942 and 1943. On the occasion of 
the first of these expeditions Argentina's antarctic territorial claim was 
officially stated to be the sector 25" to 68"34'W., south of 60"s. It should 
be  noted  that 68'34W. is  the  boundary  in  Tierra  del Fuego". 
In 1946 an Argentine postage stamp was issued showing the western 
limit of Argentina's  antarctic  territory  as  the 74th meridian,  which  is  approx- 
imately the westernmost point of Argentina's mainland (not Tierra del 
Fuego) . That  has  been  the  boundary  shown o  maps  and official publications 
ever since. 
In spite of her  involvement  in  the  war  Britain  was  anxious  to  maintain 
her position  in  Antarctica  and  carried out  the  Falkland  Islands  Dependency 
Survey (Operation Tabarin) in 1943-4 under the joint sponsorship of the 
Colonial Office and  the  Admiralty. Two ships,  the William Scoresby  and  the 
Fitzroy,  sailed  south  from  the  Falkland  Islands  to  Deception  Island,  where 
Base  B  was  established  for  weather  observation  and  for  territorial  adminis- 
tration.  The  ships  then  turned  southwest along the  coast  in  search of another 
possible  site.  Meteorological  observations as  well  as geological,  topographical, 
and  biological surveys  were  conducted  and  the  ships  returned to the  Falkland 
Islands  in  February 19443s. 
The  end of the  war  brought  a  spate of antarctic  expeditions:  the  United 
States Navy's  Operation  Highjump,  headed  by  Rear  Admiral  Byrd  in 1946-7, 
Operation Windmill 1947-8, the  Fin  Ronne  Antarctic  Research  Expedition 
of 1947-8; the Argentine expeditions of 1947, 1947-8, and 1948-9; Chilean 
expeditions of 1947, 1947-8, and 1948-9; and the British Falkland Islands 
Dependencies Surveys of 1947-8 and 1948-937. 
After  the  Argentine meteorological station on Laurie  Island,  in  contin- 
uous operation since 1903, the next oldest permanent settlement in the 
Antarctic  is  Base  B,  established  by  the  British on Deception  Island in 1944. 
Argentina's  second  antarctic  station  was  established on Melchior  Island on 
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March 31, 1947 and  has  been  maintained  in  active  status  ever since38. Later 
in  the  same  year, on November 20,1947, an  Argentine  party  landed  at  Decep- 
tion  Island  to  protest  the  establishment of British  Base  B  and  to  establish 
the  third  Argentina  antarctic  station only 4 miles  from  Base B. There  have 
been  reports of some "incidents"  between  personnel at  the two  bases,  shots 
fired in the air, removing of flags, and exchange of token protests", but 
these incidents have usually been strictly pro forma and  there  have  been 
other  reports of friendly  football  matches,  exchanges of courtesy calls, with 
toasts to the Queen or the President. Human relations among the few 
persons  in  the cold continent  tend  to  be  warm,  despite  national  differences. 
Chile's first permanent antarctic  settlement  was  the  Prat  Base,  estab- 
lished  in  January 1947, at  Isla Gonz6lez Videla  (formerly  Greenwich  Island), 
and  from  that  time  on  the  Maritime  Governor of Chilean  Antarctica  and  an 
officer in  charge of the  postal  agency  have  resided  there.  The  island  is  one 
of the  South  Shetland  group  and is located at 62"30'S., 59'41'W. 
The second Chilean base, maintained by the  Army,  is  at  the  extreme 
tip of the Palmer Peninsula (O'Higgins Land), 63'19'S., 57'54'W. It was 
inaugurated  in 1948 by  none  other  than  President  Gabriel Gonz6lez Videla40, 
the only chief of state of any  country  over  to  set foot on antarctic soil. Chile 
had in 1961 three other permanent antarctic stations, established in 1951, 
1955, and 1957 respectively. 
Early  in 1962 other  countries  were  operating  antarctic  bases  as follows: 
Argentina, seven bases with 100 men; United Kingdom, eight bases with 
90 men;  United  States,  two  bases  with 184 men;  Soviet  Union,  three  bases 
with 113 men;  Australia,  three  bases  with 70 men; New Zealand,  two  bases 
with 32 men;  France,  one  base  with 17 men;  Japan, one  base  with 16 men, 
and  South  Africa, one  base  with 10 men41. 
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed by the 21  
American republics at Rio de Janeiro in 1947 provided for an American 
Defense Zone extending to both poles and including the antarctic sector 
between 24'W. and 9OoW., which is almost,  but  not  quite,  identical  with  the 
combined  Argentine-Chilean  claims (25'-90'). The  treaty  provides  that  an 
armed attack by any state against an American state, which takes place 
within  the  security zone,  shall be  considered  as  an  attack  upon  all  American 
states. Although this provision has nothing to do with sovereignty, it is 
often  cited  by  both  Argentina  and  Chile  in  support of their claims. It does 
mean  that  the  United  States  might become involved  in an unpleasant  tangle 
with  friendly  allies in case of any open  hostilities  among  Britain,  Argentina, 
and Chile over their respective claimed territories. 
The  thorny  question of what  the  United  States would do in  the  event 
of a  Russian  encroachment  has, of course,  frequently  been  mentioned, espe- 
cially  since the  Soviet Union  has  become  exceedingly  active in  the  Australian 
quadrant. 
In 1948 the Department of State decided the time had come to bring 
the question of territorial claims to a head and sound out international 
opinion  on  some sort of solution,  such  as  an  international  regime  in  which 
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all countries with a legitimate interest could participate on a basis of 
equality, relinquishing or pooling their claims. A  Foreign  Service Officer, 
Caspar  Green, who had been “desk officer” for  antarctic  affairs,  travelled 
to the capitals of all  the  claimant  powers  to  present  notes  along  the  lines 
indicated  and  to  discuss  the  idea  with  foreign  government officials. Although 
Green was  courteously  received,  his  plan  received  no  encouragement  except 
in London. The British would have welcomed this opportunity to get rid 
of the  heavy  expense of maintaining  their now permanent  stations  and  still 
save  face  for  the  Empire.  Elsewhere  the  responses  were  unfavourable. No 
one  was  willing to yield an  inch of sovereignty.  Faced  with  this  reaction  the 
United  States took no further  action  until 10 years  later42. 
In 1949 the British, Chileans, and Argentines, sincerely desirous of 
avoiding incidents of violence that might embarrass them all, started ex- 
changing notes, with copies to Washington and other interested capitals, 
saying that they foresaw no reason to send warships south of the 60th 
parallel for military purposes during the coming year. These notes have 
been  sent  annually  ever  since  and  amount  to  a  sort of modus 
From  time  to  time  the  British  suggested  that  the  matter of conflicting 
claims should be  submitted  to  the  International  Court of Justice  for  final 
determination. In 1955 Britain  prepared  a  formal  application  for  arbitration 
of her  disputes  with  Argentina  and  Chile  and  forwarded  a  well-documented 
presentation of her case  to the  Court  at  The  Hague.  In  it  were  set  forth  the 
historical  and  legal  bases  for  Britain’s  claims  as  well  as  detailed  charges of 
alleged Chilean and Argentine acts of violation. In the presentation the 
British  set  forth  a  number of facts  or  allegations  that  the  Argentines  and 
Chileans  had  always  carefully  avoided  in  their  propaganda,  such  as  their  fail- 
ure to voice any  objections at  the  time of the  pronouncement of the  British 
claim in 1908 and  Argentina’s  overtures  to  buy  the  South  Orkney  Islands 
from  the  British  in 1914. In accordance  with  the  rules of the  Court,  Britain 
agreed  to  accept  compulsory  jurisdiction  and  to  abide  by  its  decision44. 
As Britain had expected, both Argentina and Chile refused to accept 
the  jurisdiction of the  Court  and  their  curt  replies  were  published  by  the 
Court,  together  with  the  British  application  and  its  enclosures,  to  bring  the 
“case” to a close, In rejecting the Court’s jurisdiction, both countries ex- 
pressed  their  unwillingness  to  place  any  part of their  national  territory  under 
adjudication  by  any  foreign  entity.  Likewise,  both  referred  to  the  inclusion 
of the  sector  within  the  security zone  established by the  Treaty of Rio  de 
Janeiro  and  argued  that  this  precluded discussion of any possible  alienation 
of such territory considered essential to the defence and security of the 
western hemisphere45. 
By placing their case fully on record  and  forcing  their  adversaries  to 
refuse  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  the  British  succeeded  in  making  it  appear,  to 
outside  observers at least,  that  the  two  South  American  countries  did  not 
have  full confidence  in the  validity of their positions. 
It is of course  also true  that  even  a  failure of Britain  to  win  the  case 
would still have left the South American countries with the unresolved 
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dispute  between  them.  As long as  the  British  threat is present  they do  not 
seem  to  be  very  much  concerned  about  settling  their  controversy.  A  typical 
Argentine  statement  on  this  aspect is that of Albert0  Luis  Quaranta  in  “El 
Sexto  Continente” (1950) : 
“There is little doubt that like the Argentine Republic, Chile enjoys valid titles 
with respect to the  possession of antarctic land in the South American quadrant. The 
same reasons of geographical and historical nature serve her and to a certain extent 
the juridical reasons are similar, even though our country excels her notably in the 
matter of permanent and effective occupation. In any case it is unquestionable that 
the South American quadrant of the sixth continent belongs entirely to Argentina 
and Chile”l6. 
In October 1951 the Executive Board of the International Council of 
Scientific Unions agreed to sponsor the International Geophysical Year 
(IGY)  in 1957-8. It was  planned  and  conducted  as  a  world-wide multidisci- 
plinary  study of man’s total  environment.  By  means of co-ordinated simul- 
taneous meteorological observations  in  all  parts of the  world it was  hoped 
to solve or clarify  many  problems of geophysics, such  as  the origin of cosmic 
rays,  laws  governing global weather  patterns,  and  aurora. 
Similar  previous efforts had  been  made  in 1882-3 and 1932-3 with sig- 
nificant results despite a comparatively meagre participation and limited 
programs, and it was desired to make the 1957-8 program universal and, 
accordingly, of even  greater  value  to science. All  countries  were  invited  to 
participate  and most of them did. Preliminary  meetings  were  held  in Rome 
in 1954 and  in  Paris  in 1955 to  co-ordinate planning. Because of the  strategic 
importance of Antarctica  in meteorology, the  antarctic  program of the  IGY 
was  expected  to  be  a  very  important  part of the whole undertaking  and  the 
scientists of the world were  hopeful  that political considerations  and  rivalries 
would not be  permitted  to  stand  in  the  way of its successful rea1i~ation.l~ 
It was at first expected that only those countries that had conducted 
recent activities in Antarctica would establish IGY stations there, but to 
the  astonishment of most of the  delegates  at  the  Paris  meeting,  the  Soviet 
representative announced an ambitious program for his country. In fact, 
he  said,  the  USSR  might  build an observation post at  the  South  Pole itself. 
When the American representative promptly said that the United States 
had  already  made  plans  to  put  one of its stations  at  the  Pole,  the  Russians 
settled  for  the  South Geomagnetic Pole. 
Besides the  United  States  and  the  Soviet Union all  the  antarctic  claimant 
powers  as  well  as Belgium, Japan,  and  South Africa established  antarctic or 
subantarctic  IGY  stations.  The  American  and  Soviet  participations  were of 
such  magnitude  that it was  necessary  to  mount  extensive  preliminary  expe- 
ditions to get ready for them, reach the remote localities and build the 
stations.  The  preliminary  US  expeditions  were  known  as  Operation Deep- 
freeze I (1955-6) and I1 (1956-7)48. 
The  United  States  maintained  a  station  at  Little  America  and  a  naval 
air  facility  at McMurdo Sound  (both  in  the  sector claimed by New Zealand), 
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the  Ellsworth  Station  (in  the zone claimed by Britain  and  Argentina),  the 
Hallett  Station,  jointly  with  New Zealand in  the zone claimed by  the  latter, 
Wilkes Station,  in  the zone  claimed  by Australia,  the  Byrd  Station,  in  the 
heart of the  unclaimed  sector,  and  the  Amundsen-Scott  IGY  station  at  the 
South  Pole,  where  all  sectors  converge.  The  Byrd  and  Pole  stations  can  be 
reached  only  with  the  greatest of difficulty, but  there  were  strong  political 
considerations  that  led  the  United  States  to  persevere  in  their  establishment. 
The main Soviet base was at Mirny (66’33% 93’E.) and other bases 
were  at Vostok at  the  South Geomagnetic  Pole  and  Sovietskaya at  the  Pole 
of Inaccessibility.  The  Soviet  undertaking  was  second  to  none  in  magnitude 
and  daring,  as  well  as in the  number of persons  involved.  The  fact that all 
Soviet stations were situated in the sector claimed by Australia gave rise 
to fears  in  Canberra  lest  they  might  not  be  abandoned  after  the IGY. 
Australia  maintained  the Mawson Station  in  her  sector.  France  operated 
two  stations,  Dumont  d’Urville  and  Charcot,  both  in  her  narrow  sector.  New 
Zealand had  her own station, Scott, 2 miles from the US naval facility at 
McMurdo  Sound.  Norway  had  one station  in  her zone and offered  hospitality 
to  the  Japanese  and  Belgian  stations.  Britain  maintained  sixteen  IGY  sta- 
tions, ten of which were on the Palmer Peninsula. Argentina and Chile 
maintained  eight  and  seven  stations r e spec t i~e ly .~~  
The  antarctic  program of the  IGY  was  highly  successful  from a scientific 
viewpoint  and  can  also  be  said  to  have  served  the  useful  objective of pro- 
moting better understanding, co-operation, and good will among scientists 
of the  participating  countries.  Many  stations  received  exchange  visitors  and 
observers  from  other  countries, who were  invariably  treated  with  the  utmost 
courtesy  and  deference.  The  conflicting  claims of Argentina,  Chile,  and  Great 
Britain  did  not  stand  in  the way of friendly  exchanges of observers  among 
those  countries.  Neither  did  strained  relations  between  the USSR and  most 
of the  other  countries. It  has  been  reported  that  the  familiarity  made neces- 
sary by close quarters,  isolation,  and long winter  nights,  far  from  breeding 
contempt  and  tensions,  did  much  to  promote  better  personal  relations  and 
harmony.  Fortunately,  observers  were  usually  men of science of high  calibre, 
little  inclined  to  political  debate. 
Even  before  the  IGY  was  fully  under  way  there  began  to  be  speculation 
and  concern  about  what  would  happen  when  it  was  over.  Surely,  thought 
officials of the  western  countries,  the  elaborate  and  expensive  installations 
being  built  by  the  Soviet  Union  would  not  be  casually  abandoned.  Australia, 
claimant  to  that  territory,  was  frankly  apprehensive  about  the  impairment 
of her rights, realizing that there was nothing she could do by herself to 
oust  the  Russians.  Even  Argentina  and  Chilean officials began  to  worry  about 
what  they would do if the  Russians came  into their zones. It was  one  thing 
to voice a pro forma protest  about  British  encroachments  and  top  it off with 
a  toast  in  scotch  or vino tinto, but  they  had no appetite  for vodka. Yet  the 
Argentines  and  Chileans  sensed  that  there  was no one  to  whom  they  could 
turn for  comfort on grounds of legality  in  such  a  contingency.  The  Americans 
refused  to  recognize  their  territorial  claims,  the  British  were  their  rivals  and 
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even  their own  claims were  in  mutual conflict. 
Meanwhile,  the  scientists of many  countries,  while  not  concerned  about 
the  political  implications  and  rivalries of the  participating  countries,  were 
seriously concerned lest anything stand in the way of continued fruitful 
scientific co-operation  both  during  the  IGY  and  in  the  post-IGY  period. 
During 1957 officials of several  claimant  countries  approached  the De- 
partment of State Washington, with suggestions that the United States 
take  the  initiative  in calling a  conference  in  which  the  Americans  and  all 
claimant  powers  would  discuss  the  attitude  to  be  assumed  in  the  event of 
a Russian decision to remain in Antarctic after the end of the IGY. The 
following  year,  when  Secretary of State  John  Foster  Dulles  was  in  Australia, 
Foreign  Minister  Richard G. Casey  brought  up  the  matter specifically. 
The  United  States  ultimately concluded that  instead of trying  to  exclude 
the  Russians  from  Antarctica  it would be  better  to  invite all  countries  with 
an  interest  in  the  area,  including  the  USSR,  to  participate  in  a  conference 
to  be  called for  the  purpose of assuring  that  the  continent would  be  used 
for  peaceful  purposes  only.  A  proposal  along  this  line  was  made  to  repre- 
sentatives of Britain,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand, who  held  a  series of talks 
in Washington following the  Casey-Dulles  conversation  in  Canberra. Soon 
thereafter,  informal  approaches  were  made also to representatives of France, 
Norway,  Chile,  and  Argentina.  With  some  reluctance,  all  finally  agreed,  after 
consultation  with  their  governments,  to  participate  in  informal  discussions 
with one another  and  with  the  Russians.  The first  meeting  was at  the Wash- 
ington home of Ambassador Paul C. Daniels, who had been appointed a 
special  assistant  to  the  Secretary of State.  Other  participants  included diplo- 
matic  representatives of the countries  mentioned.  At  subsequent  meetings 
diplomatic  representatives  from  Belgium,  South  Africa,  and  Japan  were  also 
invited to attend. 
Relatively  rapid  progress  was  made  through  these  preliminary  informal 
talks.  As  a  result of agreement  reached at  this  level,  invitations  were  sent 
out  in  the  name of President  Eisenhower on May 3,1958 addressed  to  Great 
Britain,  Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, France, Norway, Chile, South 
Africa,  the  Soviet Union,  Belgium,  and  Japan,  inviting  them  to  send  delegates 
to a  conference  in  Washington  to  be  held  for  the  purpose of concluding  a 
treaty  in  which  the  contracting  powers would agree on freedom of scientific 
investigation in the Antarctic by citizens of all countries in the spirit of 
international co-operation initiated during the IGY, and on the use of 
Antarctica for peaceful purposes only, including any other purposes not 
inconsistent  with  the  United  Nations  charter.  The  invitation  expressed  the 
view that  in  such  a  treaty  it would  not be  necessary for  any  participating 
nation  to  renounce  whatever  basic  historic  rights  or  claims  to  sovereignty 
it might  have  asserted  and  that  the  treaty  could  provide  that  such  rights or 
claims  would  remain  unaffected  and that no new rights would  be  acquired 
or new  claims  made  by  any  country  while it was  in  force.  “In  other  words”, 
the  note  said,  using  an  apt  pun,  “the  legal status quo of Antarctica  would 
be  frozen  for  the  duration of the  treaty,  permitting co-operation in scientific 
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and  administrative  matters  to  be  carried  out  in  a  constructive  manner  with- 
out being  hampered or affected in  any way  by  political  considerationss0. 
Acceptance of the  invitation was  a  foregone  conclusion  since  the  draft 
of the  note  had  been  discussed  and  cleared  with  the  foreign  representatives 
and some of them  had  had  a  hand  in  drafting  it.  Indeed,  it  appeared  as if the 
ingenious  proposal,  simple  and  logical  as it was,  offered the  ideal  solution  to 
save  face  all  around  and  to  facilitate the co-operation  desired  by  all. 
The  conference  took  place  in  Washington  from  October 15 to  December 
1, 1959. It was attended by high-level delegations. In the opening plenary 
session  each of the  national  delegates  made  a  formal  statement.  The  Chilean 
delegate,  Ambassador  Marcia1  Mora,  referred  to  his  country’s  historic  claims 
and  long-standing  interest  and  activities. “My country  is  the closest  one to 
the  antarctic  continent,”  he  said  and  recalled  that  he,  as  Foreign  Minister 
in 1940, had  signed the  decree defining  Chile’s antarctic  sector.  He  expressed 
his  country’s  full  support  for  the  overall  objectives of the  conference. 
The Argentine delegate, Ambassador Adolfo Scilingo, referred to the 
Argentine-Chilean  recognition of mutual  rights,  pointed  out  that  Argentina 
was  the first country  to  establish  a  permanent  settlement  in  the  Antarctic, 
and  described  the  many  activities of Argentine  scientists  in  the cold conti- 
nent.  He  said  Argentina  was  pleased  to  co-operate  in  the  conference on the 
clear  understanding  that  her  rights  and claims were  not  under discussion. 
The British delegate, Sir Esler Dening, lauded the purposes of the 
conference  and  dwelt  at  length on Britain’s  acts of discovery  and scientific 
research  in  the  area. 
The  Soviet  delegate,  Vasili V. Kutznevsev,  reminded  those  present  that 
Antarctica  was  discovered by a  Russian  and  that  the  Soviet  undertaking  dur- 
ing  the  IGY  was  the most  ambitious of all,  centred  mainly  in  the  interior  areas 
hitherto considered inaccessible. But he made this noteworthy statement: 
“The selfless work of Soviet  explorers  in  Antarctica  gives  valuable scientific data, 
which become available to  the scientists of all  countries.  The  Soviet scientists naturally 
realize that  the  results of their  research  constitute  only  a  part of what  has  recently 
been  done  by all scientists working  in Antarctica. We are glad to note  that  in  Antarctica 
-the coldest region of our planet - exceptionally warm relations have developed 
between scientists from  different  countries.”sI 
Ambassador Daniels of the  United  States  said  he would refrain  from 
enumerating  in  detail  the  many  activities of American  explorers  and scien- 
tists,  lest he  tire  the  listeners,  but  he  did wish  to put on record  that  those 
activities  were  extensive  and  had  been  carried  out  over  a  long  period of time. 
“It is our hope,” he said, “that not only will we successfully conclude a treaty 
along the lines that have been outlined and which we will further refine, but also, 
having  concluded that  treaty, we hope that  there will  radiate  forth  from it and  from 
Antarctica  and  into  an  otherwise  troubled  world  a  little  additional  warmth  and  under- 
standing, additional light and knowledge, and added hope for peace.”52 
The  treaty  concluded  at  the  conference follows the  general  lines of the 
American proposal outlined in the letter of invitation. To ensure  that  the 
continent  will  be  used  for  peaceful  purposes  only,  it  made  provision  for  an 
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effective and  unprecedented  system of inspection. It contains  the  expected 
provisions concerning  territorial claims and  rights. It is of indefinite duration, 
but  after 30 years  any  party  can  call  a  conference  for  review  and  amendment. 
In addition  to  the  original  signatory  powers, it is open for accession by  any 
state,  which is  a member of the  United Nations or which  is  invited  to  accede 
with  the  unanimous  consent of the  contracting  parties. 
The  last  three  countries  to  ratify  the  treaty  were  Argentina,  Chile,  and 
Australia,  all  in  June of 1961. The  treaty  came  into effect on  June 23,  196153. 
In announcing its becoming effective, President  John F. Kennedy said, “I 
earnestly  believe  that  the  Antarctic  Treaty  represents  a positive step  in  the 
direction of world peace.”54 
The first inspections of foreign bases were made when New Zealand 
inspected  three  American bases, including  the  South  Pole  station  in 1963. In 
September 1963 the US .  Government  invoked  the  treaty  when it requested 
permission to visit the  Soviet  and  other  foreign bases. The  State  Department 
said  it  had no  evidence of any violations, but  wanted  to  establish  a  precedent. 
The  Soviet Union  raised  no objection and  the U.S.  inspection  team,  including 
experts on nuclear testing and biologists to check on the conservation of 
penguins  and  seals,  left  Washington  for  the  Antarctic  on  December 26,  1963. 
The  inspection  was  expected  to  be completed by  March 1,  196455. 
It is  to  be hoped that  the  treaty will prove so successful that  the  ques- 
tion of national  sovereignty will become purely academic and,  as  time goes 
by, all but forgotten. Although the intrinsic and tangible value of the 
resources of Antarctica  has  yet  to  be  proved,  in  this  day of interplanetary 
exploration  any  part of our own little globe, however  inhospitable  its  climate 
or  terrain, will appear  to  be  very close. The  absurdity of different  terrestrial 
states  staking  out claims on the moon, Jupiter, or Mars, or of sectors  thereof, 
may possibly be avoided if those  states  that  have  discovered,  explored, or 
settled parts of Antarctica will lay aside their rivalry and work together 
peacefully and  harmoniously  in  the  interest of science and of all  mankind. 
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